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Abstract. The main aim of this article is to show how a possible theoretical articulation 
between Uexküll’s notion of Funktionskreis and the stratificational model of semiotic 
structures proposed by Louis Hjelmslev can be made. In order to bridge the gap 
between these two models, Luis Prieto’s model of cognition will be used. The advantage 
of Prieto’s model is that it retains the Hjelmslevian stratificational ideas (i.e. a semiotic 
structure is made up of an expression and a content plane, each one with a dimension 
of form and substance), while it also pays attention to agency and practice. To put it 
briefly, according to Prieto the foundation of practice and knowledge is to be found on 
aisthesis. Hence, as in Uexküll, there is a way to merge action with perception, while 
retaining the semiotic structure that makes such a merging possible. The key point, 
however, is that Prieto’s model calls for an “ontological commitment” to the substance 
strata (both in expression and in content to some extent). Therefore, bridging Uexküll 
and Hjelmslev via Prieto suggests a possible way to provide a general structural model 
of semiosis which is closer to semiotic realism than to immanentism usually attributed 
to structuralism.
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1. Introduction
The aim of the article is to present some preliminary approximations to a general 
semiotic theory derived from the works of Louis Hjelmslev, Luis Prieto and Jakob 
von Uexküll. Given the contemporary situation in our field, it seems almost 
self-evident that a general semiotic theory should be able to give an account of 
sign systems, and semiosis itself, pertaining to domains that fall well beyond the 
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immediate target of the theories developed by Hjelmslev or by Prieto, i.e. a general 
semiotic theory could not restrict itself to anthroposemiosis. This is not trivial 
now, as it was not trivial fifty years ago when Sebeok started zoosemiotics, or 
thirty years ago when biosemiotics began to be developed as a proper branch 
of semiotics. Conversely, a general semiotics could not be restricted to the 
immediate object of Uexküll’s theorizing, i.e. zoosemiotics, or even, let us assume, 
biosemiotics. Given that the two theoretical orientations we have chosen concern 
themselves with two complementary dimensions of the object of study of our 
discipline (i.e. anthroposemiotics and zoosemiotics), it seems plausible that 
by bringing them together we could obtain a general theory applicable both to 
anthroposemiosis, zoosemiosis, and hopefully other realms beyond these two1. 
In other words, a look at the present state of semiotics leaves no doubt about 
the importance of biosemiotics as a central branch of the field, especially when 
it comes to its relationship with general semiotics. Indeed, biosemiotics deserves 
a very special place within our discipline, for we would expect that the laws 
discovered by biosemiotics would help us to have a better understanding of 
semiosis in its minimal stances, e.g. by further developing our minimal models of 
semiosis, and thus they should be able to contribute in building a comprehensive 
general theory of semiosis tout court. From this point of view, it would seem almost 
natural to move towards Uexküll in order to develop Hjelmslev’s and Prieto’s ideas 
into an explicitly general theory of semiosis (i.e. a general semiotics). Nevertheless, 
in order to keep our work rigorous, we will restrict ourselves with just a small 
aspect of this endeavour. Thus, the present work will have the following four 
claims (which are strictu sensu formal claims regarding the nature of the possible 
future theory) as its main axis. 
(1) The theoretical articulation between Uexküll and the aforementioned 
structuralist thinkers can contribute to the elaboration of a general model 
of semiosis rooted in structuralism.
(2) It is possible to read Uexküll’s Funktionskreis2 from a Hjelsmelvian-
oriented point of view, which mainly draws on his stratificational model.
1 By integrating these two models, we would not claim that communicational processes are 
the same for humans and animals; at most the claim would be that some elementary basic 
structures of semiosis could hold for both humans and animals. Notice the defi nition of 
semiosis and semiosic relations outlined in the following section.
2 Since this Uexküllian notion can be translated both as ‘functional cycle’ and as ‘functional 
circle’, each translation laying some emphasis on diff erent aspects of it (cf. Kull in press where he 
attributes linearity and automatic execution of operations to ‘functional cycle’, and simultaneity 
along with choice between options to ‘functional circle’), we would like to keep the original 
German term and avoid these issues for the moment.
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(3)  Within this (Hjelmslevian) structural approach, the notion of pertinence, 
as posed by Prieto 1975, is necessary for understanding the coupling of 
perception and action highlighted by Funktionskreis. 
(4)  Structural models of semiosis (the Hjelsmslevian, the Prietonian and, to 
some extent, also the Uexküllian one) can be dynamic.
In addition to these four claims, a fifth claim, resulting from the analysis (and 
thus, in a certain sense, being of a different nature than the previous ones), can 
be drawn.
(5) There are two ways in which the dynamicity of semiosis can be depicted 
within this structural framework, namely
(5a) Funktionskreis is a connotative semiotic structure (as defined by 
Hjelmslev 1943), or
(5b) Funktionskreis presents a double pertinence in the content plane 
(Prieto 1977[1975]).
Let us start with the exposition of our proposal.
2. Umwelt as a semiotic structure
As a first basic assumption, we will follow the idea that semiosic relations are real 
relations, although their mode of existence is mainly immaterial. A consequence 
of this first assumption is that semiosic relations are dependent upon a subject3. By 
this second assumption (i.e. semiosic relations are dependent upon a subject), we 
are inclined to say that semiosic relations are first and foremost mind-dependent 
relations, but as this might seem too strong a statement, let us simply assume that 
a necessary (and probably also sufficient) condition for there to be semiosis is the 
existence of a self 4, or, to put it in other words, a complex system (i.e. an organism) 
3 Th ese two assumptions are present throughout many works within semiotics. Th e inter-
pretation of umwelt presented by Deely (2001a, 2004) in which umwelt can be regarded as 
objective reality (in the specifi c sense Deely attributes to “objective”) is of main importance. 
Deely’s interpretation of umwelt and its connection to an ontology of relations, which, from 
our point of view, is a major point for a comprehensive semiotic ontology, is found in Bains 
2006. 
4 Or subject. Our second assumptions only holds if we deem it necessary for semiosic 
relations to be actual (thus implying that to be virtually a sign is not enough for something to 
be a proper sign) and hence that the lower semiotic threshold leaves physiosemiosis out of the 
scope of semiotic inquiry, because it would be impossible to think about semiosis beyond the 
realm of the living. Support for this position can be found in Hoff meyer 2012, Kull et al. 2009, 
or Kull 2018b. A notable opponent to this position is Deely (2001b, 2014 among other works). 
A general outline of the discussion can be found, for instance, in Nöth 2001. 
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able to establish differences in its extrinsic conditions, and to use those differences 
actively to preserve its existence, i.e. what Deacon (2012), for instance, has called 
teleodynamic organization. The possibility of differentiating, and of recognizing 
differences as such, results in the fact that, in a very broad sense, semiosic relations 
can be characterized as relations of interpretation, that is to say, a relation from a 
teleodynamic system (henceforth: t-system) to its extrinsic conditions in which 
some portions of the extrinsic conditions of the t-system are correlated with 
some portions of the system’s phenomenical reality. Thus, t-systems will assign 
phenomenical identities to certain portions of their extrinsic conditions. This is 
nothing else than another way to characterize umwelt as modelling (see e.g. Kull 
2010) – and semiosis as a form of knowing. 
The main problem posed by the conceptualization of umwelt as modelling, 
or mapping, is that of explaining how this mapping is carried out; if an umwelt 
is indeed a model, and if it correlates the extrinsic conditions of a t-system 
with the phenomenical reality of such t-system, then it is possible to posit the 
existence of a modelling function that maps the set of elements present in the 
extrinsic conditions into a set of pertinent elements constituting the t-system’s 
phenomenical reality. The crux of the matter is thus how to characterize the 
modelling function that enables umwelt formation? I would like to argue that, 
at least partially, the answer is to be found in closely considering the notion of 
Funktionskreis as a process by means of which the umwelt as system is actualized, 
and generated. This will be explained in the next section.
3. System and process
To say that umwelten can be characterized as mapping or modelling amounts to 
saying that an umwelt is a structure that provides rules, or rule-like processes, 
for assigning values (i.e. phenomienical identities) to given portions of the 
environment, thus, in a more precise way, an umwelt would be characterized as a 
semiotic structure. By ‘semiotic structure’ we mean an ‘entity consisting of internal 
dependencies’ (cf. Hjelmslev 1959)5. Following the Hjelmslevian view, and, in a 
5 Hjelmslev’s original claim we are paraphrasing reads: “On comprend par linguistique 
structurale un ensemble de recherches reposant sur une hypothèse selon laquelle il est scien-
tifi quement légitime de decrier le langage comme étant essentiellement une entité autonome 
de dépendances internes, ou, en un mot, une structure.” (Hjelmslev 1959:21). [“By structural 
linguistics we understand a set of researches relying on a hypothesis according to which it is 
scientifi cally valid to describe language as being essentially an autonomous entity of internal 
dependencies, or in one word, a structure.” My translation, I. C.] Trabant (1987), among 
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general sense, the structural tradition starting with Saussure to which Hjelmslev 
belongs, we should readily distinguish between two aspects of a semiotic structure: 
system and process. This distinction is useful in order to differentiate between 
the structure as such, i.e. the system, and its actualization in a given instance, i.e. 
the process. Notice, however, that the dependency between system and process 
is asymmetrical: the process presupposes the system, but the system does not 
presupposes the process6, which means that the process is not necessary for there to 
be a system (it is theoretically possible to have a system that never gets actualized in 
a concrete process), but if there is a concrete process then there is a system enabling 
its existence. Hjelmslev calls this kind of dependencies ‘determinations’, i.e. unilateral 
dependencies in which a term presupposes the other but not vice versa. It is possible 
to say that, in Hjelmslevian terms, the process determines the system. 
others, has shown that it is possible to substitute ‘language’ by the more general ‘semiotic 
structure’, because glossematics is better understood as a general semiotic theory rather than a 
specifi cally linguistic theory. When paraphrasing Hjelmslev’s claim we decided to leave aside 
the autonomous part of the claim, since we will follow a more substantialist view in which 
autonomy of semiotic structures would pose problems. Regarding the term ‘semiotic structure’, 
it is important to highlight that it brings Hjelmslev and Prieto close together, due to the fact 
that Prieto proposed his concept based on Hjelmslev’s (Fadda 2003:125). 
6 A word should be said about presupposition. On the one hand, it has been signalled by 
many authors that presupposition is the main relation articulating Hjelmslev’s glossematics. 
Yet as it seems that only Ariza (2012) has made a deep characterization of the Hjelmslevian 
presupposition, it is very important to take Ariza’s characterization into account for it 
allows us to distinguish between other kinds of presupposition (e.g. as the term is used in 
pragmatics or semantics). According to Ariza, the Hjelmslevian relation of presupposition can 
be characterized as follows: given two terms, A and B, B presupposes A if B is a suffi  cient 
condition for there to be A (every time B is the case, A is also the case, i.e. the presence of B 
is enough to assure the presence of A), and A is a necessary condition for there to be B (the 
presence of B demands the presence of A). He then goes on to say that, thus, what is at play is 
a seeming reversal of the relationships of antecedence and consequence, because on the one 
hand: (I) if the NECESSARY antecedent A then the POSSIBLE consequent B, and on the other 
hand: (II) if the suffi  cient condition B then the necessary condition A. Th is can be explained, 
Ariza claims, because in (I) antecedence and consequence are equalled to logically previous 
and logically posterior, while (II) is dependent upon the “syntagmatic-functional relations” of 
the semantics of a conditional. Yet in both cases B presupposes A, and A is presupposed by B. 
Moreover, presupposition in this sense is not a logical operator but a set predicate, i.e. a relation 
that generates ordered pairs. Th us presupposition is a relation of order, and has as its properties 
to be irrefl exive, asymmetric and transitive (Ariza 2012). Th e value of this characterization, it 
seems to us, goes well beyond clarifying the algebraic foundations of glossematics; to defi ne 
presupposition in this way (as a relation of order with necessity and suffi  ciency as rules of 
correspondence) can throw light on another problems of description that we will try to show 
in the following sections.
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It is important to bear in mind that the Hjelmslevian model is a model of 
description; it is a theoretical model in a strong sense, and as such it does not 
directly concern itself with any kind of metaphysical assumptions. This means that, 
from a strictly Hjelmslevian point of view, a determination could be nothing more 
than an epistemic category useful for describing relationships, i.e. dependencies, 
between parts of a structure (cf. Hjelmslev 1961:39). However, following Prieto 
1988, we can begin to argue for an interpretation of some of the major tenets of 
Hjelmslev’s model from a substantialist7 point of view; namely, a point of view 
ontologically committed to substance, in the Hjelmslevian sense of the term 
(Prieto 1975; cf. Badir 2001). This is not at all trivial. Let us put it in this way: a 
determination is a function established between two functives, a constant and a 
variable; at the macro structural level, the system is the constant and the process 
is the variable. On each of the planes of a semiotic structure, the dependencies 
7 We call Prieto’s point of view a substantialist one based on his own statements: “c’est par 
la présence et par l’absence d’une même modifi cation des organes sensoriels que se manifestent 
respectivement, dans l’aisthesis, les caractéristiques composant un couple des caractéristiques 
corrélatives, et par conséquent, d’un point de vue qui, nous l’admettons volontiers, peut être 
qualifi é de «substantialiste», ce n’est pas n’importe laquelle des caractéristiques composant un tel 
couple qui en constitue le terme positif ou le terme négatif, celle qui se manifeste par l’absence de la 
modifi cation des organes sensoriels dont la présence manifeste l’autre constituant bien entendu, de 
ce point de vue, le terme négatif” [“it is by the presence and by the absence of one and the same 
modifi cation of the sensorial organs that the characteristics composing a pair of correlative 
characteristics are manifested in aesthesis, and consequently, from a point of view that we 
readily admit as “substantialist”, it is not any of the characteristics composing such couple the 
one constituting the positive term or the negative term. Th e one manifested by the absence 
of the sensorial organs’ modifi cation, whose presence constitutes the other characteristic, 
constitutes, from this point of view, the negative term.”] (Prieto 1975:88; my translation, I. C.). 
It is nevertheless important to bear in mind that, as Fadda has pointed out: “[…] le materialism 
[…] de Prieto, […] se base sur une idée de réalité matérielle, qui existe en soi et indépendamment 
de la connaissance de l’homme, mais n’a pas d’ « essences » qui puissent déterminer a priori 
la façon dont elle est connaissable.” [Prieto’s […] materialism […] is based upon an idea of a 
material reality that exists in itself and independently of human knowledge, but which lacks 
“essences” that could determine a priori the way in which it is knowable.] (Fadda 2013: 7; 
my translation, I. C.). Th roughout this paper, we will refer to this materialist approach as a 
substantialist stance. Yet it is equally important to notice that even though, as Fadda rightly 
claims, Prieto’s material reality does not consist of essences that determine the knowledge one 
can have of it, Prieto’s materialism does entail constraints on the ways of knowing objects, 
that Eco (2007: 39), when commenting on Prieto’s notion of pertinence, has called impossible 
pertinences and that, it seems to us, Prieto himself asserts when saying that the negative term 
in a privative opposition is manifested by an absence of modifi cation in the sensorial organs. 
Drawing from these considerations, our interpretation of Prieto’s substantialist stance will to 
some extent be more realist than merely materialist.
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between form of content and substance of content, and form of expression and 
substance of expression, are also determinations in which form is the constant 
and substance is the variable. Thus, substance can be defined in Hjelmslevian 
terms as “the variable in a manifestation”8. If one were to make an ontological 
commitment to substance, this would seemingly mean making an ontological 
commitment to what should be somewhat ontologically undetermined. Prieto’s 
susbtantialist stance, however, commits to the materiality of substance regarding 
its “determined” aspects from the point of view of form. In other words, Prieto’s 
substantialist stance seeks to find material correlates, in substance, of the pertinent 
features established by form. Yet, the substantialist stance does not necessarily 
mean making substance ontologically determined, inasmuch form is, to some 
degree, arbitrary (or, to use a less controversial term, dependent upon a point of 
view). 
Taken to its last consequences, the substantialist stance could result in reversing 
Hjelmslev’s claim that “a system […] governs and determines [the process] in 
its possible development” (Hjelmslev 1961: 39). The substantialist stance would 
ultimately force us to admit that even though granting that the process presupposes 
the system, the process shapes the system by means of actual practices. Indeed, one 
could say Hjelmslev (1954: 171) was already aware of this possible interpretation 
when he wrote:
la détermination (fonction unilatérale entre la substance comme variable et la 
forme comme constante) n’est valable que du seul point de vue syntagmatique 
(comme un sélection), tandis que du point de vue paradigmatique il ya réciprocité 
(plus particulièrement : complémentarité) entre forme et substance, la substance ne 
peut jouer le rôle d’une variable que dans les cas nets où par l’analyse immédiate le 
syntagmatique est seul en cas.9
A syntagmatic is a semiotic process (Hjelmslev 1961: 135), and as a process 
it is relational in Hjelmslev’s sense of the term, which is to say it is a function 
of the type “both… and…”. A paradigmatic, on the other hand, is a semiotic 
8 A manifestation is both a selection, i.e. a type of determination, between system and 
process, and the specifi c relationship between form and substance (Hjelsmlev 1954: 166). A 
discussion of manifestation in similar terms to the ones we are discussing can be found in 
Siertsema 1965: 126–129. 
9 “Th e determination (unilateral function between the substance as variable and the form 
as constant) is only valid from the syntagmatic point of view (as a selection), while from the 
paradigmatic point of view there is reciprocity (more specifi cally: complementariness) between 
form and substance; substance cannot play the role of a variable but in the specifi c cases in 
which, for the immediate analysis, the syntagmatic is the case.” (My translation, I. C.)
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system, and as such it is correlational, again in Hjelmslev’s sense of the term; it 
is a function of the type “either… or…”. Thus, only in the process is it valid to 
characterize the relationship between form and substance as a determination. In 
the system, however, it appears as complementariness10. The decisive step taken 
by the substantialist stance consists in granting an ontological foundation to a 
type of relation included by Hjelmslev’s descriptive model (i.e. the Hjelmslevian 
determination, especially as manifestation). 
Coming back to the main problem we are addressing, mainly that of concep-
tualizing umwelt as modelling and explaining how such a model is carried out, we 
can begin to draw some corollaries:
(i)  If a t-system can generate an umwelt, and the umwelt in question is a semiotic 
structure, then umwelt could be considered both as a syntagmatic (process) 
and as a paradigmatic (system). 
(ii) The paradigmatic dimension of umwelt would be presupposed by the 
syntag matic dimension of it, yet the syntagmatic dimension would shape the 
paradigmatic one by means of actual practices. 
(iii) The syntagmatic aspect of umwelt is Funktionskreis. 
(iv) Since an umwelt comprises both Merkwelt and Wirkwelt, these two aspects 
are to be included both in each dimension of the umwelt, i.e. the paradigmatic 
(the umwelt as system), and the syntagmatic (Funktionskreis as process). 
(v)  Each dimension of an umwelt has two planes (a Merk-plane, and a Wirk-
plane). If we characterize these planes as Hjelmslevian planes (after Hjelmslev 
1954), each of them would comprise a stratum of form and a stratum of 
substance. 
(vi) In the syntagmatic, i.e. Funktionskreis there is a Hjelmslevian determination 
between form and substance.
(vii) After Prieto’s substantialist stance, substance imposes material correlates to 
form, thus process shapes system, and thus Funktionskreis as process shapes 
umwelt as system.
Nevertheless it is important to notice that even if one decides to follow the 
substantialist stance, substance still presupposes form. Form is only established by 
a principle of pertinence, as a principle of pertinence is necessary for making and 
recognizing differences in substance. If a given element in the extrinsic conditions 
10 Indeed, it is possible to read the syntagmatic function, “both… and…”, as intersection 
between classes, and the paradigmatic function, “either… or…”, as union between classes. A 
syntagmatic would then refer to simultaneity of facts or, to put it in other words, to the co-
occurrence, hic et nunc, of a chain of facts (the chain being somewhat conceptualized as an 
intersection between classes of facts, cf. Prieto 1977: 209). On the other hand, a paradigmatic 
would consist in all the possible facts pertaining to each of the classes present in a syntagmatic.
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of a t-system can be recognized by the t-system, this is only because the pertinence 
principle logically precedes the act of recognition, and thus substance is dependent 
upon form; for there to be an object that is recognizable, form must have been 
established previously. The substantialist stance only claims that the features of 
substance can influence and shape form, thus resulting in the fact that form is 
not independent of substance (as substance is not independent of form – after 
all, there is paradigmatic complementariness between them). Ultimately, what the 
substantialist stance is claiming is that neither form can be reduced to a systemic 
aspect, nor can substance be reduced to a material aspect. To put it in other words, 
knowing arises at the meeting of semiotic structure and material reality. 
4. Practice
Contrary to the standard reading of Uexküll, according to which the umwelt 
is mainly the subjective world, our aim is to characterize umwelt from the 
point of view of a semiotic realism in which umwelt cannot be reduced to the 
phenomenical, nor to affordances in the surroundings. It is thus not arbitrary 
that we have chosen to conceptualize umwelt formation as modelling. Indeed, 
according to Ivanov (1962: 201), a model is a “form that reflects an object, and 
it is composed by a finite numbers of elements plus the relations between those 
elements”. Such elements, and their relations, must be present in the modelled 
object, but they are only recognized as present in the modelled object inasmuch 
they carry pragmatic value (cf. Ivanov 1962: 201). In other words, the depiction in 
the model of the modelled object is tied to the pragmatic relevance of the features 
borne by the modelled object; a model will substitute an object with respect to 
certain aspects of such object, i.e. there is a productive way in which a model 
substitutes an object (cf. Lotman 2011[1967]: 251). 
The substantialist stance we presented in the previous section can be related 
to Ivanov’s notion of model. Indeed, retaining in the model the features of the 
modelled object that carry pragmatic value can be interpreted as correlating a 
set of form-features in the model with a set of substance-features present in the 
modelled object. The notion of pragmatic value is a key element for bringing these 
positions together. Following Prieto, knowledge about material reality is always 
directed towards a way of acting upon the material reality that is being known; 
knowledge, he claims, always involve a practice (Prieto 1977[1975]: 151). 
Moreover, a practice, following Prieto 1987, always involves the ability to 
choose between executing a transformation which causes the practice, or not 
executing the transformation; i.e. a practice presupposes a faculty of decision. 
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This conclusion has also been reached in biosemiotics, for instance, in Kull 2018b, 
or the opening remark in Kull 2018a: 383: “Semiosis assumes choice – even if 
the organism is not aware of it. For instance, a dog who starts barking is not an 
automaton – at least during a brief moment it can (subconsciously) choose either 
to do so or not”. Looking at Prieto’s theory from a biosemiotic point of view, we 
could say the dog executes a practice11. However, Prieto himself would probably 
disagree with the idea of the dog performing a practice in the outlined sense, since 
he states (Prieto 1987: j10) that only humans, who are conscious of the numeric 
identity of their own body, can be properly called subjects and thus have a faculty 
of decision12. In order to interpret Prieto’s position as founding a general theory 
of semiosis, we would have to accept that a subject’s conscious awareness of the 
numeric identity of his own body is not a necessary condition for endowing the 
subject with a faculty of decision; the concept of decision, and hence the concept 
of practice in Prieto would have to be read in a more general sense. 
In any case, let us assume that this widening of Prieto’s concept is possible, and 
that to know an object means to make it perform a determined role (as means or 
as ends) in a given practice. In its turn the practice is founded upon a criterion of 
pertinence derived from the semiotic structure by means of which a subject knows 
(or cognizes) material reality. Taking into account everything that has been said 
up to here, if we assume that Funktionskreis is a practice, then 
(viii) Funktionskreis presupposes a criterion of pertinence (and an umwelt as 
model will retain the relevant pragmatic aspects of the modelled objects); 
(ix)  Funktionskreis presupposes a semiotic structure; and 
(x) Funktionskreis presupposes a faculty of decision. 
11 It would be necessary to specify which kind of objects are at play in such a practice. To 
make a tool out of a stone is a practice that has a material object as its end (i.e. the tool being 
produced); a speech act, or as Prieto would say, a semic act, is a practice that has a non-material 
object as its outcome, i.e. the sense, or the message, that is being conveyed by the speech act, 
and that is also using as means an object diff erent in some regards to the object used as means 
in a practice such as making a tool out of a stone (cf. Prieto 1976: 165-167, 1987, and specially 
Prieto 1997 for the distinction between material and symbolic practices). Th e pertinence of the 
features borne by the objects in each practice would be diff erent to some extent, as material 
objects have “intrinsic” qualities which render them pertinent from the point of view of a given 
practice (cf. Prieto 1976: 167). 
12 Th is problem has been discussed in depth in Fadda 2007.
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5. Prieto’s model of cognition
We have said that a practice is founded upon a criterion of pertinence provided 
by the semiotic structure by means of which a subject knows material reality. In 
a response to Burger’s review of Pertinence et pratique, Prieto (1976: 167) defines 
pertinence in the following way:
La «pertinence» est pour moi la qualité de ce qui est pertinent, et «pertinent» est, 
dans mon usage technique, ce que l’on dit d’une caractéristique d’un objet qui est 
reconnue par un sujet et qui compte donc pour l’identité sous laquelle ce sujet connaît 
l’objet en question. Si parfois je parle pourtant comme si j’identifi ais pertinence et 
point de vue, c’est parce que la pertinence des caractéristiques pertinentes d’un objet 
est toujours la conséquence d’un point de vue duquel le sujet considère cet objet. Ce 
point de vue est toujours celui d’une pratique exercée par le sujet […].13
In Pertinence et Pratique, as well as in his entry on “Relevance” written for Sebeok’s 
Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics (Prieto 1994), Prieto also defines pertinence 
as a relationship of equivalence among the objects that can be used by a subject 
either as means or ends of a practice (Prieto 1975: 101, 1994). Pertinence as a 
relation of equivalence is established by classification systems. Prieto’s concept of 
classification system is derived from the notion of characteristic (or feature, I will 
use these two terms interchangeably) and the notion of difference. Indeed, Prieto 
claims that to recognize a characteristic in an object entails the recognition of 
differences in other objects, even if these differences are only virtually recognized 
(cf. Prieto 1975: 82–83, 99). He writes,
Le calcul que suppose le fait de reconnaître qu’un objet comporte une ou plusieurs 
caractéristiques et qu’il diff ère par conséquent d’autres objets est donc le calcul de 
deux ou plusieurs classes auxquelles peut appartenir cet objet ou, plus exactement, 
puisque ces classes sont toujours en rapport logique d’exclusion entre elles et que leur 
somme logique est par défi nition égale à l’univers du discours, le calcul de ce qu’on 
appelle un système de classement. (Prieto 1975: 98)14
13 “Pertinence is, for me, the quality of being pertinent, and ‘pertinent’, in my technical usage, 
is said of an object’s characteristic which is recognized by a subject and which counts for the 
identity under which the subject knows [or cognizes – I. C.] the given object. If therefore at 
times I speak as if equating pertinence and point of view, it is because the pertinence of the 
pertinent characteristics of an object is always the consequence of a point of view from which 
the subject considers such object. Th is point of view is always that of a practice executed by the 
subject […]” (my translation, I. C.).
14 “Th e calculus that is implied by the fact of recognizing that an object bears one or more 
characteristics and that consequently the object diff ers from another objects is the calculus of 
two or more classes to which the object can belong to, or more exactly, and because these classes 
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Thus, a totality of objects, that Prieto calls a universe of discourse, is classified 
(or ordered) via pertinence as relations of equivalence. A class thus would be 
established by equivalences among objects, with two mutually exclusive classes 
being the minimal classification system, e.g. class A and its complement. Notice 
that if a classification system is a calculated then the virtual recognition of the 
objects that would be members of the complementary class is possible. Indeed, 
Prieto posits a crucial distinction between virtual knowledge and actual 
knowledge. Actual knowledge is the confirmation, hic et nunc, that this specific 
object is a member of a specific class. A cognitive act, according to Prieto (1975: 
115), can only be actual.15 
Regarding the recognition of the characteristics borne by the object, Prieto 
(1975: 88) writes that “[u]n objet n’apparaît pas comme tel, c’est-à-dire comme ne se 
confondant pas avec le néant tant que le sujet ne reconnaît pas, dans l’aisthesis de 
la portion de la réalité qui le constitue, la présence d’une modification déterminée 
des organs sensoriels”.16 Furthermore, he says that the absence of modifications in 
the sensorial organs amounts to a negative characteristic, i.e. the term defined as 
‘absence’ in a privative opposition.
The previous statements come together in the entry “Relevance” in which he 
writes in a somewhat Kantian fashion,
Th e perception of an object by a subject is always achieved through a concept, 
which can of course be either explicit or implicit, that is to say that the subject is 
not necessarily able to detail the features which constitute it. To perceive an object 
are always in a logic relation of exclusion between them and their logic sum is by defi nition 
equal to the universe of discourse, it is the calculus of what we call a classifi cation system” (my 
translation, I. C.).
15 Prieto (1975: 99) originally wrote, in French, ‘connaisance actuelle’ and ‘connaissnace 
virtuelle’. It seems possible to use the English word ‘actual’ when translating ‘actuelle’ because 
of two main reasons: (i) when discussing these two types of knowledge, Prieto specifi es that the 
recognition of characteristics entails, fi rst, the calculus of classifi cation systems and, second, 
determining which one among the possibilities calculated by a classifi cation system is really 
(eff ectivement) taking place (Prieto 1975: 99); (ii) in determining the possibility that is really 
taking place Prieto talks of verifi cation (‘constatation’ in the original French text); he writes: 
“un acte cognitive intervient chaque fois qu’un sujet constate [my emphasis, I. C.] l’appartenance 
d’un objet à une des classes composant un système de classement notatif” [“a cognitive act takes 
place every time a subject verifi es the membership of an object to one of the classes composing 
a notative classifi cation system.”] (Prieto 1975: 115; my translation, I. C.). 
16 “An object does not appear as such, that is to say as not being confused with nothingness 
inasmuch the subject does not recognize, in the aesthesis of the portion of reality that constitutes 
the object, the presence of a determined modifi cation of the sensorial organs” (my translation, 
I. C.). 
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is, in other words, nothing but to recognize it as the realization of a concept and 
therefore to recognize in it those features, and as a rule only those of its features, 
that constitute this concept. (Prieto 1994: 794)
Following Prieto, then, a characteristic entails a difference, and a characteristic 
is recognized in aesthesis. To know an object is to recognize it as a member of a 
class of objects involved in a given practice. In order to recognize that an object 
is a member of a class, some of its features need to render the object equivalent to 
other objects bearing the same, or mostly the same, features. The recognition of 
these features as actual features borne by the object is achieved through an actual 
confirmation (schematized as: THIS object belongs to class A, and differs from 
SOME OTHER object, cf. Prieto 1975: 100). The actual confirmation of the fact 
that an object bears a given feature is achieved through the aesthesis of the portion 
of reality that the object constitutes. In aesthesis the object manifests its features 
exerting modifications upon the sensorial organs of the subject. Thus a cognitive 
act starts in sense perception. 
6. Planes and stratifi cation
We have seen that, according to Prieto’s model of cognition, it is by means of 
modifications in the sensorial organs that an object appears properly as an object 
to a subject. In a communicational act, the listener interprets a given utterance by 
assigning phenomenical identities to the string of sounds (thus in-forming the 
acoustic substance). These phenomenical identities are dependent upon a given 
classification system. However, phenomenical identities of sounds are dependent 
upon yet another classification system that determines what can be said by means 
of the phenomenical identities of sounds. These two classification systems are the 
two planes constituting a semiotic structure (i.e. an expression plane of signifiers 
and a content plane of signifieds). However, this is not exclusive of linguistic 
systems. A tool can be thought of as a bifacial entity as well (Prieto 1975: 64). 
Indeed, following Prieto, to operate with two classification systems constituting 
two planes that furnish pertinence to each other (i.e. to operate with semiotic 
structures) is a property of the very act of knowing.
In corollaries (vi) and (v) of Section 3, we have characterized umwelt as a 
semiotic structure. Umwelt would then consist of two planes, characterized as 
Hjelmslevian planes and thus having strata of form and substance. This amounts 
to characterizing umwelt in correspondence with Fig. 1
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Figure 1. The stratificational model of a semiotic structure (after Hjelmslev 1954).
Corollary (v) posited the existence of a Wirk-plane and a Merk-plane. It seems possible to 
equate Wirkwelt with the content plane and Merkwelt with the expression plane, since the Merk-
plane would assign phenomenical identities to perceivable objects (Uexkull 2010: 47–49). On 
the other hand, given that Merkzeichen would elicit a determined response, the Wirkwelt could 
be characterized as the content plane.
Furthermore, Prieto posits a difference between the classification systems per-
taining to each of the planes. The classification system that establishes the classes 
constituting the expression plane is a notative classification system, as it does 
not supposes any other classification of the elements of the expression plane. On 
the contrary, the classification system that establishes the classes of the content 
plane is defined as a connotative classification system because it supposes at least 
another classification of the elements of the content plane (Prieto 1975: 108). The 
fact that one can use a knife both for cutting and as a screwdriver is explained by 
the fact that there is a classification system establishing the utility of a knife and a 
classification system establishing the operations that can be executed by means of 
a knife (cf. Prieto 1975: 109). The knife as such is given only one identity, i.e. it is 
known by a notative classification system.
To explain things in a clearer way, let us consider the well-known example of 
the tick’s Funktionskreis presented in Uexküll (2010: 50). In the tick’s Funktions-
kreis, the mammal’s skin glands function as feature carriers (Merkmal), they are 
then recognized as proper perception signs (Merkzeichen) and correlated with the 
possibility of performing a practice, namely ‘release legs’.
The smell of butyric acid common to all mammals is a form-feature in the tick’s 
umwelt. Let us use ‘/…/’ to denote elements of form and ‘[…]’ to denote elements 
of substance on each plane. We can then write /butyric acid/ to refer to its smell 
as perceived by the tick, i.e. as an element of form (and, conversely, [butyric acid] 
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of equivalences among multiple objects in the tick’s environment (Uexküll 2010: 
179). This Merk-plane would then have a classification system consisting in two 
classes; namely +/butyric acid/, and -/butyric acid/. It seems plausible to think 
that this classification system would not suppose another classification referred to 
the elements in this plane, and thus we could consider it as the expression plane. 
On the other hand, regarding the content plane, a naïve way of putting the 
Funktionskreis into the stratificational model, would have to decide between two 
options: is the content plane constituted by the mammal as perceived by the tick 
(as in Fig. 2A) or by the activity ‘release legs’ (as in Fig. 2B)? 
A      B
 
Figure 2. Two naïve ways of representing Funktionskreis as a semiotic structure.
The models in Fig. 2 miss the point of coupling action with perception; therefore, 
it is necessary to include the two aspects constituting the content plane into one 
single structure. As we stated in claim (5) at the beginning of the article, there are 
two possibilities of doing this. The first possibility is to posit that Funktionskreis is 
best explainable as a connotative structure (as in Hjelsmlev 1961), Fig. 3 illustrates 
this possibility.
Figure 3. Funktionskreis as a connotative structure.
To posit that Funktionskreis is explainable as a connotative structure amounts to 
saying that there are two signs at play. First, there is a complete sign made up 
by /butyric acid/ on the expression plane and /mammal/ on the content plane. 
This complete sign will in its turn function as the expression plane for another 
sign which would have ‘release legs’ as its content plane, by virtue of /mammal/ 
functioning as an indicator for the activity ‘release legs’.
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The second possibility of explaining Funktionskreis as a semiotic structure 
would simplify the structure of the sign, it would posit the existence of only 
one sign, but it would make the semiotic structure itself more complex. This 
other possibility consists in endowing Funktionskreis with a double pertinence 
on the content plane, thus implying that two classification systems are at play 
simultaneously. This alternative possibility is illustrated in Fig. 4.
Figure 4. Funktionskreis as double pertinence on the content plane. Content C = connotative 
classification system on the content plane. Content N = notative classification system on 
the content plane.
According to this possibility, the expression plane would be constituted solely by 
/butyric acid/. The double pertinence on the content plane would pose a notative 
classification system on the content plane correlating /mammal/ with /butyric 
acid/, and a connotative classification system also on the content plane correlating 
/mammal/ with the possibility of executing the activity ‘release legs’.
The fact that the Wirk-plane refers both to /mammal/ and to the activity 
‘release legs’ supports the idea that the Wirk-plane can be taken as the content 
plane, since there are two classification systems at play, a notative classification 
system establishing classes of objects and a connotative classification system 
establishing classes of activities. Thus, via the notative classification system in 
the Wirk-plane, there is a correlation established between /butyric acid/ and 
/mammal/. The connotative classification system, which is connotative in relation 
to the first notative system in the Wirk-plane, would establish the correlation 
between /mammal/ and ‘release legs’. In addition, [mammal], i.e. the mammal 
as substance would be not immediately graspable by the tick, it would certainly 
influence the establishment of /mammal/ as form element, but it would constitute 
a different stratum and thus the Uexküll’s notion of ‘counterstructure’ (Gegenfüge) 
would correspond to substance as matter. 
Content  C             ‘release legs’
Content  N             /mammal/
Expression             /butyric acid/
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Conclusions
To decide between the two options, Funtionskreis as a connotative structure or 
Funktionskreis as exhibiting a double pertinence on the content plane would call 
for weighing the advantages of each model against proper descriptive work. 
In any case, the conceptualization of Funktionskreis as a semiotic structure, 
and furthermore as a syntagmatic, can contribute to explaining how codes are 
established, for indeed by assuming, on the one hand, that Funktionskreis pre-
supposes a faculty of decision, and, on the other hand, that Funktionskreis is a 
process and thus it can shape the system it ultimately produces, it is possible to 
reach the conclusion that practices might beget habits and semiosis might beget 
codes. The main problem of this proposal lies in how to characterize a subject 
capable of semiosis and what it actually means to have a faculty of decision. It is 
at this point that the approaches at play divide. This difference, however, does not 
seem to be impossible to overcome. From the point of view of a general semiotics, 
the basic and general mechanisms of semiosis should remain mostly the same 
throughout different meaning-making processes. The differences at the level of 
explanatory models would be rendered less relevant than their similarities.17 
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Funktionskreis и стратификационная модель семиотических 
структур: Якоб фон Икскюль, Луис Прието и Луи Ельмслев
Основная цель этой статьи – показать возможность теоретической артикуляции связи 
между функциональным кругом Икскюля и предложенной Луи Ельмслевом страти-
фика ционной модели семиотических структур. Для соединения этих двух моделей 
используется когнитивная модель Луиса Прието. Преимущество модели Прието состоит 
в том, что она сохраняет стратификационные идеи Ельмслева (т.е. семиотическая струк-
тура составлена из планов выражения и содержания с дальнейшим различением в 
них формы и субстанции), в то же время уделяя внимание деятельности и практике. 
Основа практики и знания заключается по Прието в эстезисе (aisthesis), что делает 
возмож ным (как и в случае Икскюля) соединить действие и восприятие, сохраняя 
семиотическую структуру. Ключевым моментом, однако, является то, что модель 
Прието требует “онтологической приверженности” субстанции (как в плане выражения, 
так и  – в меньшей степени  – в плане содержания). Поэтому соединение Икскюля и 
Ельмслева через Прието дает возможность предложить общую структурную модель 
семиозиса, которая ближе к семиотическому реализму, чем к имманентизму, обычно 
приписываемому структурализму.
Funktionskreis ja semiootiliste struktuuride stratifi katsiooniline mudel: 
Jakob von Uexküll, Luis Prieto ja Louis Hjelmslev
Artikli peamine eesmärk on näidata, kuidas on võimalik teoreetiliselt sõnastada kokkupuudet 
Uexkülli Funktionskreis’i mõiste ning Louis Hjelmslevi poolt välja pakutud semiootiliste 
struktuuride stratifikatsioonilise mudeli vahel. Nende kahe mudeli ühendamiseks kasutatakse 
Luis Prieto kognitsioonimudelit. Prieto mudeli eeliseks on see, et selles säilitatakse hjelmslev-
likud stratifikatsiooniideed (s.t semiootiline struktuur koosneb väljendus- ja sisuplaanist, 
millest kummalgi on vormi ja substantsi mõõde), pöörates samas tähelepanu ka agentsusele ja 
praktikale. Lühidalt väljendudes peitub praktika ja teadmise alus Prieto järgi esteesis (aisthesis). 
Seega, nagu ka Uexkülli puhul, on võimalik tegutsemist tajumisega ühte liita, säilitades semioo-
tilise struktuuri, mis muudab sellise liitumise võimalikuks. Olulisim on aga see, et Prieto mudel 
kutsub üles “ontoloogiliselt pühenduma” substantsikihtidele (nii väljenduses kui teatud määral 
ka sisus). Seetõttu annab Uexkülli ja Hjelmslevi ühendamine Prietot kasutades võimaluse 
pakkuda välja semioosi strukturaalne üldmudel, mis on lähemal semiootilisele realismile kui 
strukturalismile tavaliselt omistatavale immanentismile.
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